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ABSTRACT
After the 2014 general election and through 2021, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) decided to become the executive power’s loyal opposition under President Joko Widodo. PKS’s decision to join an opposition party resulted in a substantial increase in its vote total, from 6.79% in the 2014 election to 8.21% in the 2019 election. There are hints that PKS intends to replicate the strategy employed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), which became President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s opposition during his two terms in office and won the 2014 election. Using secondary data and qualitative descriptive analysis, this study examines the model and pattern of PKS opposition to the Jokowi administration between 2014 and 2021. This study’s findings indicate that the relationship model between PKS and the government is cooperative rather than antagonistic. As an opposition party under a presidential system, PKS works as a balancer and controller of power through selective rather than universal criticism of government policies and performance.

Keywords: loyal opposition, election, presidential model, PKS.

ABSTRAK

Kata Kunci: Oposisi, Pemilihan Umum, Model Presidensial, PKS.
INTRODUCTION

In the tradition of democratic countries, since the first, the positioning of political parties as the opposition to the government (executive) is an inseparable part of democracy (Dahl, 1971). Democracy always requires a balance value through the mechanism of checks and balances, so there must be some political parties in the legislature that play the role of opposition, namely standing outside the government. That is in line with the definition of opposition given by Garritzmann, namely parties, factions, or members of parliament who are not part of the government or those still in office (Garritzmann, 2017).

Although the practice of democracy in post-Reformation Indonesia recognizes the existence of parties in opposition to the government, the quality and consistency of the opposition are still questionable. Western political scientists who have done a lot of studies on Indonesian politics like Dan Slater said that the opposition practices carried out by political parties in Indonesia have so far failed (Studies, 2018). After the reform era, the hope of the emergence of the opposition did not occur. The president prefers a broader sharing of power, including embracing the parties that lost in the election.

In other words, post-Reformation Indonesian politics rarely have loyal opposition in parliamentary institutions due to the practice of power-sharing that is too broad by the authorities. This practice of sharing the power cake by Slater is called cartelization (Studies, 2018). Here this practice has an impact on the vacuum of political parties that want to become opposition. In other words, theoretically, the practice of cartelization becomes a causal variable for the vacancy of the loyal opposition in the legislature. For this reason, talking about loyal opposition cannot be separated from the cultural background of power that likes to practice cartelization.

However, according to Slater (Slater, 2018), party cartelization in Indonesia is different from the party cartelization developed in Europe. Party cartelization in Indonesia significantly
disrupted democratic accountability because there was no balance of political power. As long as the Indonesian president sees the benefits of multi-force support from either side, the existence and role of the opposition will remain difficult to identify. As a result, opposition in Indonesia is only a half-hearted partisanship opposition instead of a loyal opposition.

Previous studies have shown that the indiscriminate sharing of power hampers the development of the identified political opposition in Indonesia. There is a very flexible coalition-building practice in which existing parties can express or express their willingness to share executive power with other parties after elections (Slater & Simmons, 2012). Even after very tight political competition, such as in the 2014 and 2019 elections, parties diametrically opposite can still show a fluid position after the election.

The distribution of power in the executive to the parties haphazardly will result in a frail quality and consistency of parliamentary opposition. Party cartelization through power-sharing activities that are too gigantic will make the existing parties lazy to become loyal opposition. Even more surprising, Indonesia’s four democratically elected post-reform era presidents have all shown a tendency to share power with all majority parties after they have won. The search for power by parliamentary parties takes place under a broader system of presidential power-sharing (Slater, 2018).

Democracy in Indonesia does not automatically produce a lively and identifiable party opposition because almost no party immediately becomes an opposition post-election. Even in the era of President Joko Widodo since the first period, political cartelization occurred by involving existing parties. The reforms in the era of President Joko Widodo did not occur because of cartelization (Muhtadi, 2015).

According to the cartelization model, political parties ignore the election results, collectively ignore their ideological and programmatic attitudes, and fall into the hands of the government
and are patronage to the state. With party collusion or cooperation in the form of a cartel, the party is highly dependent on the state (Pizzimenti, 2017). Because political collusion serves as a fundamental driver of Indonesian political behavior and parties share a common interest in enjoying the office, they stay away from society. In the end, the political system falls into the accountability trap (Slater, 2004) due to the failure of political parties to establish oversight and balance at the government level (Muhtadi, 2015).

Meanwhile, President Jokowi was in open conflict with his party in the first year of his first term (Duile, 2021). He was besieged by an opposition majority in parliament and dramatically declined his opinion poll numbers. In the early days of his administration, Jokowi only pocketed the support of 37% of all members of parliament. However, behind the scenes, Jokowi devised a strategy to gain control of his power (Duile, 2021). In his second year, Jokowi was capable turn his minority position in the legislature into a large majority and improving his place in the vote. As a result, Jokowi has not just strengthened his position against his party but has also garnered initial support for another presidential nomination in 2019 from parties that previously opposed him (Duile, 2021).

In the second period of his leadership, the power that President Jokowi accumulated was even more significant than in the first period. The Gerindra party, a rival for two consecutive elections, ultimately chose to join the government coalition party. The general chairman of the Gerindra party, Prabowo Subianto, even became one of the ministers in his cabinet.

As a result, in the second period of Jokowi’s administration, his coalition of supporters controlled the DPR by occupying 427 parliamentary seats, while the opposition party only had 148 seats. The government coalition party consists of 128 seats for PDIP, 85 for Golkar, 78 for Gerindra, 59 for NasDem, 58 for PKB, and 19 for PPP. Meanwhile, the parties that did not join the government consisted of the Democratic party with 54 seats, PKS with
Until now, the institutionalized opposition has not received strong support from the community. The concept of opposition is not well entrenched or lacks public support, mainly because of an incorrect understanding of the opposition. With this lack of support, the opposition in the Reformation era seemed to be in an awkward position and instead seemed isolated from the public opinion about the government. Which was often manipulated by the government itself. However, not all groups then withdrew from the opposition position (Noor, 2016).

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is one of the political parties that, since the first period of Jokowi’s administration, declared themselves a loyal opposition. In 2015, the president of PKS, Sohibul Iman, stated that PKS, as a party in the legislature, would carry out its function as a controller (Wijanarko, 2015). In a political speech at the 4th PKS National Deliberation event in Depok, Sohibul Iman frankly said: “Nowadays, we are a loyal opposition; we are loyal to the interests of the nation. If the Great Indonesia Coalition makes good policies, we will support them, but if not, we will criticize,” (Gabrillin, 2015). PKS has echoed its self-declaration as a loyal opposition since the beginning of the first period of Jokowi’s administration.
Until 2021, PKS still chose positioning as a loyal opposition party. Even at a national working meeting (rakernas) in Jakarta in March 2021, PKS reaffirmed its position in opposition to the government. One of the opposition stances affirmed by PKS that was shown by its efforts to oppose the presidential regulation on investment in the beverage industry. PKS Secretary General Habib Aboe Bakar Alhabsyi stated that the rejection of the opening of liquor investment is one of the party’s efforts to defend the interests of the people (Budiman, 2021). At the National Working Meeting, PKS released the tagline PKS as an opposition party, ready to serve and defend the people (Indonesia, 2021).

Although the narrative developed by PKS as a loyal opposition, this claim needs to be tested further through representative indicators to measure the quality and consistency of PKS as a loyal opposition party. Joko Widodo’s government from the first to the second period.

Opposition is often interpreted as “opposite” or “something that has a different position on something else” (Noor, 2016). Opposition can also be interpreted as a group or party that opposes current government politics (McGill, J., & Soetrisno, 1996). According to Barnard political opposition is a form of contestation related to or guaranteed by the constitution (Noor, 2016). In a parliamentary system, Garritzmann defines opposition as parties, factions, or members of parliament who are not part of the government or are still in office (Garritzmann, 2017). The parliamentary opposition is run by political parties that did not win the general election and had no intention of forming a coalition in the government (Tuswoyo, 2012).

Meanwhile, Fatah (1999) defines political opposition as surveillance activities over political power that can be wrong or right. So the opposition is not an opponent, nor is it just a party that says disapproval, nor is it a group or party that only fights power blindly. The aim of opposition is not only to criticize the government but also to control, correct, and evaluate a government policy (Munadi, 2019).
In the classical political opposition literature, as explained by Brack & Weinblum (2011), political opposition cannot be separated from concepts such as checks and balances, institutional conflicts, or minority parties. When political scientists classify and study political opposition more empirically, they generally emphasize one particular type of political opposition, namely parliamentary opposition, proposed by Ionescu and de Madariaga (1968, in Brack & Weinblum, 2011) as a modern political system.

Although more often correlated with a parliamentary system, the role of the opposition in the context of democracy is universal in the sense that it can be present in both parliamentary and presidential systems. There is no restriction that specific government systems provide more opportunities or require opposition than others. Although the opposition in the context of checks and balances seems to be manifest in a parliamentary system, effective opposition also occurs in a presidential government. There is strong opposition to a presidential system like the United States. The opposition even existed shortly after independence, which was marked by the emergence of the Democratic-Republican Party as an opposition party (Noor, 2016).

Although opposition can arise in parliamentary and presidential systems, its characteristics differ. According to Robert A. Dahl (Dahl, 1965) and Arend Lijphart (Lijphart, 1989) the relationship between the government and opposition parties in a parliamentary system tends to be adversarial. Meanwhile, in the presidential system, the relationship tends to be negotiable and more oriented as an opposition that provides checks and balances (Tuswoyo, 2012).

Opposition parties in Indonesia tend to compromise on power, which underscores the nature of relations in a presidential system. Theoretically, the opposition party has several vital roles, first, for the balance of power. Second, to keep policy alternatives voiced. Third, as a stimulus for fair competition between the political elite and the government (Noor, 2016). (However,
the government’s opposition function as a controller and bal-
cancer has not run well in Indonesia. Conflicts often occur at the
elite level of the opposition party. In the name of the need to
build strategic alliances, several elite opposition parties have es-

tablished relationships with the authorities (Munadi, 2019).

Kirchheimer describes three different opposition models
(Brack & Weinblum, 2011). The first is the “classical” or “loyal”
opposition. This oppositional model offers an alternative to the
chosen policy and, at the same time, recognizes the government’s
right to govern and the existing constitutional system. The sec-

ond is the “principled opposition.” This oppositional model tends
to oppose both government policies and the constitutional re-

quirements of the political system. The third is “elimination of
opposition,” in which minority groups compete with those in
power but stop proposing alternative programs.

If we use Kirchheimer’s taxonomy, the classical or loyal oppo-
sition model is a form closer to the character of Indonesia’s po-

titical system and government. In this model, the opposition party
recognizes the executive government and only acts as a propo-
nent of policy alternatives. Historically, the term loyal opposi-
tion itself can be traced to the political experience of the British
state. The British government consisted of Ministers who had
the trust of the King, and the Ministers had the support of the
House of Commons. Members of the House of Commons who
do not support the government are known as Loyal Opposition.
Nevertheless, their opposition is not to the King but to the gov-
ernment (or his policies), the government they are ready to re-
place at any time with one of their own (Anastaplo, 2004).

Although initially, the term emerged from the tradition of
the British parliamentary system, the concept of loyal opposi-
tion was later used in any system, such as in the United States,
where there was an effective separation of powers. Each of the
three branches of government, namely the legislature, executive,
and judiciary, has a term of office and a series of powers that are
largely independent of the other two branches (Anastaplo, 2004).
Loyal opposition in modern democracies usually takes the form of competing political parties. The loyal opposition to those in power depends on other institutions, such as the free press and community economic organizations (Anastaplo, 2004).

Dahl uses six criteria to classify patterns of opposition (Garritzmann, 2017): 1) Cohesion of the opposition actors (their number and internal coherence). 2) Their competitiveness shows how political opponents gain and lose in elections and parliament. Related. 3) The setting in which government and opposition collide (e.g., parliament, elections, streets). 4) Distinctive (or identifiable) opposition, drawn on a continuum from systems where the opposition is so conspicuous that we can speak of ‘opposition’ to systems where the distinction between government and opposition is indistinguishable. 5) Objectives. 6) Opposition strategy.

This study will focus more on analyzing the strategic choices taken by PKS during its opposition to the Jokowi government since 2014. There are similarities between this PKS strategy and the 10-year PDIP strategy during the SBY administration. There are four types of opposition, namely integral opposition, fundamental opposition, factional opposition, and specific opposition (Skilling, 1967b). Based on these typologies, this study analyzes the typology most relevant to the oppositional behavior displayed by PKS in the public sphere.

**RESEARCH METHODS**

This study used a descriptive-qualitative method. By using secondary data sources, the researchers tried to analyze the models and patterns of the opposition of PKS to the Jokowi government from 2014 to 2021. This study uses secondary data from popular news content in online media related to PKS’s oppositional attitude to the Jokowi government since 2014. Then the data and information are induced into knowledge that is linked to political theory.

There are two issues regarding PKS’s opposition to Jokowi’s
government, namely issues of religion and ideology. In a study entitled “Mapping the Indonesian Political Spectrum,” Aspinal found that the majority of political parties in Indonesia have the same position (in the same quadrant) on various issues, except for religious issues (Aspinall et al., 2018). In the reform era issues, almost all political parties have the same view on the issue of the economy and the poor. Only issues of religion and ideology (Pancasila) PKS and PPP are in a quadrant far from the ruling party, especially PDIP.

![Figure 2: Interest Issues Political Parties](image)

For this reason, this research only focuses on diametrically opposite issues between PKS and government parties, namely those related to religious and ideological issues, including issues of its derivatives. The purpose of derivative issues here are issues that may be impure and directly related to religion or ideology but can be in the form of socioeconomic or other issues that contain religious ideological or ideological interests. Some of the most popular issues that show PKS’s opposition to Jokowi’s gov-
Government include the issue of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations (Perppu Ormas). The Draft Law on the Path of Pancasila Ideology (RUU HIP) and the Draft Law on the Elimination of Sexual Violence (RUU PKS).

DISCUSSION

In the 2014 Presidential Election, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) supported Prabowo-Hatta against the presidential candidate Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. After the candidate pair supported by PKS suffered a defeat, PKS chose not to enter the government, even explicitly declaring itself as a loyal opposition. This party also experienced a significant decrease in votes, from 7.88 percent in the 2009 election to 6.79 percent in the 2014 election (Erdianto, 2019).

However, as an opposition to the Jokowi-JK government in 2014, PKS benefited in the next election. In the 2019 election, this party’s vote increased sharply to 8.21 percent. According to Hendri Satrio, the electability of PKS had historically increased when the party chose a position outside the government (Erdianto, 2019).

There are indications that the choice of positioning PKS as an opposition party in parliament is their strategy to gain votes in the medium term, at least within two election periods. Former PKS President Hidayat Nurwahid once said that PKS could have the same fate as PDIP, an opposition party for ten years during the SBY administration, and then gained a significant increase in votes. PDIP became the winning party in the 2014 General Election (Detik, 2014).

The question is, is the strategy and model of the opposition chosen by PKS the same as the model adopted by PDIP in 2004-2014? Tuswoyo’s (2012) study showed that the PDIP opposition pattern was more likely to be adversarial on various issues during the SBY administration. According to him, the opportunity to compromise with the government, as is typical in Dahl and Lijphart’s presidential systems, is constrained by the solid ideo-
logical orientation after the repositioning and the conflicting personal relationship between President SBY and PDIP Chair Megawati Soekarnoputri.

In the context of the pattern of relations between Megawati and SBY, the opposition carried out by PDIP falls into the category that H. Gordon Skilling calls factional opposition. According to Skilling (1967), the target opponent’s faction is the individual leader rather than the regime or system in power. He stated: “Faction opposition is exercised by individuals or groups within the highest organs of parties and government, although support can be sought within broader social and political groups. Although by definition identified with disloyalty to other leaders and often embodying fundamental ideological rifts within the ruling elite, as between “nationalist” and “proletarian internationalist” or “leftist” and “rightist,” this type of top-level opposition also does not represent opposition to the system as such. Finally, there may be opposition to specific policies of the regime without a rejection of either the system or its incumbent leadership and their basic policies.

The model and pattern of opposition chosen by PKS do not appear to be the same as the PDIP. There are at least three main differences that the researcher identified:

1. PKS is not a party that tends to practice centralization of numbers, but all of its political decisions are taken structurally through deliberation mechanisms within the party.
2. The pattern of political strategy choices taken by PKS tends to be rational rather than prioritizing party leaders’ or elites’ emotional preferences and tendencies.
3. The opposition model shown by PKS tends to be negotiable.

The model of opposition shown by PKS to the Jokowi government seems to be typical of the role model of the opposition in the presidential system as practiced in the United States, the relationship between opposition parties and the government which is not facing face (adversarial). According to Tuswoyo, this model tends to compromise and can cooperate or negotiate for a larger
interest. The opposition’s role model is also not confrontational, for example, to bring down the government through a vote of no confidence, as in many parliamentary governments. In contrast, such an opposition model is more oriented toward providing checks and balances with the aim that government policies can be negotiated in the national interest (Tuswoyo, 2016).

In addition, by using the typology proposed by Skilling (1967), according to the researcher, the pattern of opposition carried out by PKS is included in the specific type of opposition. According to Skilling, certain opposition is directed only to specific policies issued by the government without fundamentally rejecting the regime or the ruling leader. Skilling (1967) states that this pattern belongs to the category of loyal opposition, which is more oriented toward changing or influencing public policy by criticizing established policies or suggesting alternative steps or future actions. He said: “In the main, this is a “loyal opposition,” seeking to change influence public policy by criticizing established policies or suggesting alternative measures or future courses of action” (Skilling, 1967a).

In this case, although PKS declares itself to be an opposition party, this party does not pretend to be an anti-government system, let alone want to replace the existing government system. PKS does not position itself as a party which Skilling’s terms, is called the integral opposition, which aims to change the system (Skilling, 1967a). This party has become more inclusive in the last decade since the 2nd National Conference (Munas) was held on 16-20 June 2010 in Jakarta, making it a more open party.

In addition, PKS did not entirely reject the primary policy (grand policy) of the Jokowi government, namely Nawacita. Since 2014 PKS has never officially declared itself to reject Nawacita but instead often criticizes government policies that are considered contrary to Nawacita. The part of Nawacita that most often becomes the theme of PKS criticism is around issues, policies, and economic performance.

For this reason, the model of loyal opposition that PKS has
shown seems to be only opposition to government policies and performance and is partialism rather than universalistic. In this regard, the chairman of the PKS faction, Jazuli Juwaini, once stated that “it does not mean that all government steps should be considered wrong.” Juwaini stated that as an opposition party, PKS must remain objective, where if the government program is considered good then PKS will support it, on the other hand, PKS will criticize government policies if they are not in the interests of the people. (PKS.ID, 2016).

This statement was also confirmed by the PKS’s attitudes on various occasions which showed a critical attitude towards policies and performance that they felt were not by the constitutional mandate. For example, some of the most popular issues include Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Community Organizations (Perppu Ormas). The Draft Law on the Path of Pancasila Ideology (RUU HIP) and the Draft Law on the Elimination of Sexual Violence (RUU PKS).

In the issue of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) firmly rejects the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law number 2 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations According to them, the contents of the Perppu can threaten the existence of community organizations in Indonesia (Tirto, 2017). According to Hidayat Nurwahid, PKS’s rejection of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations is not to ignore the security of Pancasila but so that there is no bias with various interests outside of Pancasila itself. Nurwahid said that PKS rejects radicalism, and PKS’s rejection of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations does not at all mean supporting radicalism.

Meanwhile, the Chair of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) faction in the House of Representatives, Jazuli Juwaini, said that PKS rejected the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations not because it was anti-Pancasila supporters but because PKS considered that no urgency forced the govern-
In addition, the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations is also considered to be contrary to the principles of a democratic state because it ignores the judiciary (Tempo, 2017).

In the issue of the Draft Law on the Path of Pancasila Ideology (RUU HIP), PKS also made a firm rejection. A member of the Legislative Body (Baleg) of the DPR from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) faction, Bukhari Yusuf, revealed that his faction in the DPR from the beginning had voiced rejection of the Draft Law (RUU) for the Pancasila Ideology (HIP). At the plenary meeting on May 12, 2020, the PKS faction of the DPR rejected the stipulation of the Draft Law on the Path of Pancasila Ideology (RUU HIP). This regulation ignored the constitution of TAP MPRS Number XXV/MPRS/1966 regarding the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party. It prohibited any activities from spreading or developing ideas or teachings of communism/communism/marxism-Leninism (Sindonews, 2020).

In the DPR, PKS asked the leadership of the Legislative Body of the DPR not to include the Draft Law on the Path of Pancasila Ideology in the 2021 National Legislation Program. Deputy Chair of the PKS Faction Mulyanto said that the HIP Bill received much rejection from the public (Tempo, 2020).

In line with the two previous issues, PKS also made a critical rejection of the Draft Law on the Elimination of Sexual Violence (RUU PKS). The PKS faction in the Indonesian House of Representatives rejected the draft bill and proposed changing the bill’s name to the Draft Law on the Elimination of Sexual Crimes. “We need a firm and comprehensive law based on the values of Pancasila, religion, and national culture, not with ambiguous regulations and liberal-secular ideology that contradicts the character and identity of the nation. The general chairman of PKS also said that the bill has the potential to open up space for permissive attitudes towards free sex and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) groups (Tempo, 2019).

The three issues above show explicitly that PKS an opposi-
tion feast is very sensitive to religious, moral, and ideological issues. Although not all of PKS’s oppositional expressions are shown directly and head to head with the executive government, in the above issues, PKS’s position is opposed to the mainstream parties supporting the government, especially PDI-P. In these three issues, PDI-P has always been at the forefront of the parliament that supports the three laws and regulations, the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Social Organizations, The Pancasila Ideology Bill (RUU HIP) and the Elimination of Sexual Violence Bill (RUU PKS).

However, although various religious and ideological issues, as well as derivative issues, often differ between the government and the PDI-P, PKS still positions itself as a party that shows a “classical” opposition. In contrast, according to Kirchheimer (1964, in Brack & Weinblum, 2011) classical opposition or loyal opposition still recognizes the government’s right to govern and the prevailing constitutional system. As opposition in parliament, PKS only offers alternative policies without delegitimizing the government.

Although PKS has often been critical of the policies and performance of the Jokowi administration since 2014, they have also developed a narrative of their willingness to support policies and performance that they think are good and by the constitutional mandate. On several occasions, PKS has shown support for government policies, especially for non-religious issues, such as the five-day school policy, the policy for strengthening MSMEs, empowering maritime potential, and supporting the ban on going home for Eid in 2021.

As a result, PKS has been quite successful in playing its strategy as a specific opposition and has a moderate position. His political attitudes and actions have high rationality, and his pattern of political decision-making is measurable and realistic. The critical of PKS, which represents the public’s interests, emotions, and expectations since 2014, has impacted increasing the number of votes in the 2019 General Election.
CONCLUSION

The strategy of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which claims to be a loyal opposition to the Jokowi government since 2014, has increased party votes in the 2019 Election. PKS has succeeded in becoming an opposition with moderate and specific characteristics that only partially criticize government policies and performance, especially relating to religious, ideological, and moral issues. PDIP showed the differentiating variable for the opposition model to President SBY during the 2004-2014 period. As the party carrying the presidential candidates who lost in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, PKS is still consistent in not entering the government (executive) in cartelization practices that are still strong after the Reformation.

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